Tenho escrito muitos prefácios para livros, mas nenhum me deu tanto prazer em tempos recentes quanto o livro de Caetano Costa. Estou a falar de quê? De um livro de teoria jurídica, de um livro de sociologia do direito, de um romance que tem como principais personagens dois juízes? Estou a falar de tudo isso e nessa complexidade reside o fascínio desta obra, cuja leitura eu recomendo vivamente a todos e a todas.

Os textos reunidos neste livro foram originalmente apresentados no Colóquio Internacional Kátharsis, realizado pelo programa de pós-graduação em Filosofia da FAFICH/UFMG. Os textos têm como tema compartilhado o conceito de catarse e apresentam perspectivas bem distintas - vão desde a origem do conceito na Grécia antiga até sua atualidade no mundo contemporâneo, levando em consideração seus diferentes momentos e apresentando grande diversidade nos enfoques adotados pelos colaboradores.

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

O método axiomático é considerado uma das principais ferramentas para a sistematização do conhecimento. Inaugurado na Grécia antiga, o método axiomático passou por grandes mudanças ao longo da história. Este artigo busca estabelecer as fases de evolução da abordagem axiomática. Divide-se a axiomática em três categorias: concreta, abstrata ou formal. Divide-se em a axiomática três categorias: concreta, abstrata ou formal. Em um segundo momento, o artigo aproxima a utilização do método axiomático na física quântica, através da apresentação informal da axiomática (...) de uma lógica não-reflexiva. Batizada pelo filósofo e lógico brasileiro Newton da Costa como Lógica de Schrödinger, sua motivação encontra-se na posição teórica perante o status ontológico das entidades postuladas pela física quântica, denominada Received View. (shrink)

Resumo: O fenômeno da relatividade conceitual ocorre, segundo Putnam, quando uma descrição verdadeira a partir de uma perspectiva torna-se incompatível com uma descrição equivalente verdadeira a partir de outra perspectiva. Nosso objetivo será examinar em que sentido é possível conciliar a tese da relatividade conceitual com o princípio realista de que o mundo consiste numa totalidade fixa de objetos que não dependem de nossos pensamentos ou sistemas categoriais. Para o metafísico realista, ainda que nossas conceituações do mundo tenham um caráter (...) relativo e perspectivo, daí não se segue que o próprio mundo seja igualmente dependente de nossos esquemas conceituais.: the phenomenon of conceptual relativity turns on the fact that the descriptions of the world can change truth-value upon passing from one correct theory to another correct theory. In this sense, can metaphysical realism - the perspective that the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects - recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity -/- Abstract: The phenomenon of conceptual relativity turns on the fact that the descriptions of the world can change truth-value upon passing from one correct theory to another correct theory. In this sense, can metaphysical realism - the perspective that the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects - recognize the phenomenon of conceptual relativity? (shrink)

A new split β‐lactamase assay promises experimental testing of the interplay of protein stability and function. Proteins are sufficiently stable to act effectively within cells. However, mutations generally destabilize structure, with effects on free energy that are comparable to the free energy of folding. Assays of protein functionality and stability in vivo enable a quick study of factors that influence these properties in response to targeted mutations. These assays can help molecular engineering but can also be used to target important (...) questions, including why most proteins are marginally stable, how mutations alter structural makeup, and how thermodynamics, function, and environment shape molecular change. Processes of self‐organization and natural selection are determinants of stability and function. Non‐equilibrium thermodynamics provides crucial concepts, e.g., cells as emergent energy‐dissipating entities that do work and build their own parts, and a framework to study the sculpting role of evolution at different scales. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

Margaret Archer plays a leading role in the sociological analysis of the relation between structure and agency, and particularly in the study of reflexivity. The main aim of this article is to discuss her approach, focusing on the main contributions and limitations of Archer’s theory of reflexivity. It is argued that even though her research is a pioneering one, proposing an operationalization of the concept of reflexivity in view of its empirical implementation, it also minimizes crucial social factors and the (...) dimensions necessary for a more complex and multi-dimensional study of the concept, such as social origins, family socialization, processes of internalization of exteriority, the role of other structure–agency mediation mechanisms and the persistence of social reproduction. (shrink)

Resumo: Peirce toma como verdadeiras as conclusões estáveis obtidas, a longo prazo, pela aplicação sistemática do método de pesquisa científica. Como notou Hacking, o realismo interno de Putnam duplica o processo de levar ao limite, pois acrescenta que também as normas ou padrões de racionalidade são produtos históricos que podem evoluir com o tempo e postula, no limite da investigação, uma situação epistemicamente ideal. Nossa intenção é examinar criticamente a proposta de Putnam de caracterizar a verdade como idealização da aceitabilidade (...) racional.: Peirce thinks that the truths are the stable conclusions reached by scientific inquiry continued long enough. As Hacking remarked, in Putnam's internal realism there is a double limiting process because the methods of inquiry can themselves grow. This paper aims at discussing Putnam's view that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. (shrink)

Neste artigo procuramos mostrar que o relativismo moderado é relevante para uma concepção adequada da racionalidade científica. Palavras-chave: Relativismo cognitivo, conhecimento científico, racionalidade científica, incomensurabilidade.

En Ciencia de la lógica, Hegel finaliza la lógica objetiva con un largo estudio de las categorías modales (realidad, necesidad y posibilidad). Nuestra propuesta es que tal estudio hay que entenderlo en confrontación directa con la situación dejada por Kant en los principios del entendimiento puro de KrV. Para defender tal tesis expondremos, en primer lugar, la exposición kantiana del problema; en segundo lugar, el desarrollo de la lógica de la esencia dentro de la obra; y, por último, la nueva (...) interpretación que propone Hegel de las categorías modales. (shrink)

Está bem estabelecido que a moderna noção de ser humano está firmemente ancorada no conceito de evolução natural, no que diz respeito à sua origem biológica, e no conceito de cultura, no que diz respeito à sua condição existencial e sua multiplicidade de modos de vida. Este artigo discute a relação entre o paradigma evolucionista nas ciências naturais e o pensamento antropológico moderno analisando as raízes de alguns mal-entendidos entre as duas tradições intelectuais. Notadamente, o embaralhamento entre os legados da (...) obra do naturalista Charles Darwin e do filósofo Herbert Spencer para a escola de pensamento conhecida como evolucionismo social, hegemônica entre a década de 1870 e a I Guerra Mundial no contexto antropológico. A partir da crítica dirigida aos autores desta escola por Franz Boas, fundador da antropologia cultural norte-americana, o artigo demonstra que o conceito evolutivo empregado por evolucionistas sociais como Edward B. Tylor e Lewis H. Morgan remete mais às concepções teleológicas e dedutivas de Spencer da evolução como uma lei, que às formulações indutivas e não-teleológicas de Darwin da seleção natural como um mecanismo. Por fim, o artigo salienta afinidades entre a teoria da cultura de Boas e a visão de mundo darwiniana maiores do poderia se supor, dentre as quais: uma perspectiva mais retroditiva que preditiva sobre as origens da variação natural e cultural; a substituição da ortogênese determinada pela filogênese indeterminada; e da crença no progresso absoluto e no excepcionalismo humano pelo relativismo com respeito ao lugar da humanidade e suas formas de vida cultural no mundo. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.

Texto produzido com base na experiência de redação de um Memorial Acadêmico. Reflexão sobre o sentido do Memorial, como um olhar retrospectivo sobre o passado acadêmico e o significado de sua reconstrução feita, inevitavelmente, sob a ótica do presente. Sendo diferente do sentido que possuía no momento em que foi vivido, o passado só pode ser recuperado como reconstrução póstuma.

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

At a time when ideas of crisis and critique are at the forefront of public discourse, this article seeks to understand moments of crisis vis-à-vis critique as a key feature of critical social theory. It addresses Jürgen Habermas’s strong claim that this relationship accounts for a ‘model of analysis’ concerned with grasping the ‘diremptions’ of social life. To elaborate this reading, the article pays attention to the main problems Habermas identifies in conventional ways of understanding the concepts of ‘crisis’ and (...) ‘critique’ in social theory. The aim is to examine the mode in which he reconsiders each of these terms and then reasserts the dialectical link between them. I reconstruct this relationship by taking as cases two of his most substantive works of social theorizing: The Theory of Communicative Action, and Between Facts and Norms. Based on this interpretation, I suggest that though Habermas contributes to resituating the practice of critique as a communicative translation of objective crisis, he does not adequately account for another key movement: when critique actually initiates, enacts and furthers the moment of crisis. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos avaliar criticamente algumas das teses de John McDowellsobre a natureza da virtude, tal como expostas em seu artigo “Virtue and Reason” e, ao fazê-lo,expor algumas de suas limitações. Mais especificamente, tratarei o que vejo como problemas emsua apresentação da virtude como uma forma de conhecimento, e sua proposta – corporificada natese da unidade das virtudes – de que as virtudes comumente reconhecidas deveriam ser vistascomo manifestações parciais da virtude enquanto tal. Também enfocarei a assertiva de McDowellde que (...) o conhecimento que constitui a virtude não pode ser visto como tendo um conteúdoproposicional que se preste a uma codificação em princípios de conduta – a tese de nãocodificabilidade– e a relação da postura pessoal de McDowell com a empreitada mais ampla daética de virtudes. (shrink)

Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this can explain why (...) speakers are given different degrees of credibility depending on their group identity. For example, if people assume that women are more emotional than men, they will systematically give less credibility to women’s claims. This explanation involves three empirical claims: people assume that women are more emotional than men, people assume that emotionality hinders credibility, and people give less credibility to women’s claims. While extant studies provide some support for and, no study to date has directly tested. In two different studies, we tested all these three claims. The results from both studies provide support for, as we found significant negative correlations between emotionality and credibility attributions. However, in contrast to what some accounts of folk psychology posit, we did not find any significant difference in people’s attributions of emotionality and credibility towards women versus men speakers. We hope that our studies here pave the way for further empirical studies testing the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in a context-sensitive way, in order to have a better understanding of the conditions in which testimonial injustices are likely to happen. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 1 - 28 This paper is an attempt to think through Derrida’s newly discovered _Geschlecht III_, the third and missing installment of Derrida’s four part series on Heidegger and _Geschlecht_. I argue that Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in _Geschlecht III_ needs to be situated within the philosophico-political context of Derrida’s 1984–85 seminar—given under the general title _Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism_—from which _Geschlecht III_ is extracted. In the first part of the paper, I reconstruct (...) Derrida’s general problematic of national-humanism as he lays it out in the opening sessions of the seminar, before arriving at his reading of Heidegger, who will be part of “a sequence of German national-philosophism,” as Derrida calls it. In the second part, the paper turns explicitly to _Geschlecht III_ where, as I show, Derrida’s thoroughgoing denunciation of a national-humanism in Heidegger becomes all the more telling when seen through the theoretical matrix of the seminar. (shrink)

Uma exegese filosófica da problemática do niilismo na obra de Cioran, partindo de uma análise lexicográfica dos usos discursivos deste conceito, mas sem se limitar a ele (que está longe de ter um estatuto privilegiado no discurso cioraniano). Levando em conta a reviravolta que marca uma cisão no âmago da obra de Cioran, na transição entre seus escritos romenos e franceses, e combinando à lexicografia um procedimento propriamente hermenêutico do tema do niilismo, conclui-se com uma reflexão sobre o nexo entre (...) niilismo e humor na obra francesa de Cioran, notadamente em Silogismos da amargura (1952), em contraste com o niilismo da “seriedade infinita” (sinônimo de desespero) que caracteriza a sua obra romena. (shrink)

En la actual campaña electoral uruguaya de 2019, se perfila un cuadro de descontentos generalizados que desborda claramente los estándares tradicionales de la política del país. Muchos de estos descontentos se articulan con diversos factores que los autores han venido destacando en trabajos anteriores, como señales de una mutación gradual pero efectiva de la política uruguaya. En continuidad con ese abordaje de investigación, en el artículo se indagará acerca de las posibilidades efectivas de que esta mutación política adquiera proporciones realmente (...) significativas en las actuales circunstancias, con la posibilidad de confirmación de "cisnes negros" que parecen atisbarse en la campaña electoral en curso. Para ello, luego de algunos discernimientos teóricos y metodológicos, se trabajará el itinerario de distintos indicadores de opinión pública a nivel nacional durante el período 1995-2017, vinculados con el objeto de estudio planteado. A partir de esos insumos, se realizarán algunas breves consideraciones de proyección analítica. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. (...) These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)

How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and (...) distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” (cet allemand philosophe de la (...) vie) introduces a sinister equivocality between these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option. (shrink)

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” introduces a sinister equivocality between (...) these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option. (shrink)

The canonical view of a 3‐domain (3D) tree of life was recently challenged by the discovery of Asgardarchaeota encoding eukaryote signature proteins (ESPs), which were treated as missing links of a 2‐domain (2D) tree. Here we revisit the debate. We discuss methodological limitations of building trees with alignment‐dependent approaches, which often fail to satisfactorily address the problem of ‘‘gaps.’’ In addition, most phylogenies are reconstructed unrooted, neglecting the power of direct rooting methods. Alignment‐free methodologies lift most difficulties but require employing (...) realistic evolutionary models. We argue that the discoveries of Asgards and ESPs, by themselves, do not rule out the 3D tree, which is strongly supported by comparative and evolutionary genomic analyses and vast genomic and biochemical superkingdom distinctions. Given uncertainties of retrodiction and interpretation difficulties, we conclude that the 3D view has not been falsified but instead has been strengthened by genomic analyses. In turn, the objections to the 2D model have not been lifted. The debate remains open. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/-6TBN0bubI8. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)